into what was considered a key principle of FRG politics: 'Nie wieder Krieg' (never again war). Since the 1990s, however, the FRG has increasingly deployed its military abroad. The Second World War-and indeed the 'Nie wieder Krieg' principle-are still invoked, but now as the context within which every use of the military abroad becomes a question of responsibility. 4 In 1994, then Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel declared in reference to military operations abroad, that with respect to responsibility for peace and human rights no one may stand aside, not even [the Germans]. Precisely because Germany has broken the peace in the past, it is morally-ethically obliged to participate in the defence of peace with all its power now. If there is one lesson from the period of National Socialism which is quite inescapable, then it is that unfortunately violence sometimes can just only be removed through counterviolence. Inspired by the work of Jacques Derrida, this article starts from the observation that this supposedly ethical approach to war actually effects a closure, and, moreover, one that makes it impossible to think about war as an ethico-political problem: thinking and deciding about war are turned into a question to be solved in the abstract. 7 In other words, the choice between military intervention or refraining from using the military abroad is contextualised not within the particular situation the deployment would confront-for example civil war in Bosnia or human rights abuses in Kosovo-but rather within an understanding of the past, in particular the Second World War. This abstract approach makes possible, and indeed relies on, supposedly clear distinctions between perpetrators and victims, and good and bad war.
This article argues that this closes off the space for ethico-political decisioning which must first of all recognise the lack of such clarity and acknowledge the aporia of making a decision. 8 The article explores the particular in a bid to make closure more difficult. It moves away from seeing in each question about war merely an instance to which a general rule must be applied, for example a rule about the supposed responsibility that is seen to lie in the 
Against good conscience
Although deconstruction is now a well-established strategy in the study of international relations, 11 it is perhaps useful to outline briefly the claims in relation to ethics on which my argument is based. 12 Derrida rejects what he calls the 'the generality of ethics' which, he argues, 'incites to irresponsibility'. 13 In his view, responsibility necessarily involves a transgression of such ethics. 14 He argues that we do not act responsibly or ethically when we apply a rule, direction or programme; for this 'makes of action the applied consequence, the simple application of a knowledge or know-how. It makes of ethics and politics a technology' 15 . Rather, for an ethical decision to be possible we have to experience an aporia:
a '"non-way", you cannot find your way: a-poria means that you cannot walk further, it's a blocked way, there is no way'.
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In other words, we find ourselves in an inescapable dilemma: a situation where the necessary decision is inevitably never fully ethical.
In The Gift of Death, Derrida discusses this problematic in relation to God's command that Abraham sacrifice his son Isaac. In such a situation it is impossible simply to make the ethically correct decision; rather there are 'moments in which the decision between just and unjust is never insured by a rule'. 17 Derrida calls this the 'ordeal of the undecidable':
The undecidable . . . is not merely the oscillation between two significations or two contradictory and very determinate rules, each equally imperative . . . The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreign to the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged . . . to give itself up to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules. A decision that didn't go through the ordeal of the undecidable would not be a free decision, it would only be the programmable application or unfolding of a calculable process.
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Crucially, the decision must be made-it cannot be simply avoided. However, the undecidable remains caught in every decision. 19 As a result, there is never a moment that allows us to look back at the decision in good conscience and feel certain about its ethicality.
Thus ethics becomes both possible and necessary when there is more at stake than the application of a rule. As Derrida puts it, 'I will even venture to say that ethics, politics, and responsibility, if there are any, will only ever have begun with the experience and experiment of aporia'. 20 Moreover,
To have at one's disposal, already in advance, the generality of a rule [règle] as a solution to the antinomy ... to have it at one's disposal as a given potency or science, as a knowledge and a power that would precede, in order to settle [régler] it, the singularity of each decision, each judgment, each experience of responsibility, to treat each of these as if they were a case-this would be the surest, the most reassuring definition of responsibility as irresponsibility, of ethics confused with juridical calculation, of a politics organized within techno-science.
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This means that the situation of the aporia is, on the one hand, one of despair but provides, on the other, the opportunity that makes possible an ethico-political decision. 22 It is precisely when all we know is that we do not know what to do that we can-and must--make an ethico-political decision. Such decisions thus arise in situations that are in some way 'beyond' knowledge. The belief that knowledge or rules are the secure basis for ethical decisions can never be more than a dangerous illusion that leads to nothing but 'good conscience' 23 , something that it is imperative to avoid.
24

Writing the war
The Germans are often seen as obsessed with their past, that is, with the history of the Third The two novels read in this article are no different: they focus on the war experience of people who are depicted as unable to shape the war itself. In other words, they do exactly what critics see as at least dangerously close to construing Germans as the 'real' victims of the war. The question of National-Socialism as the political context of literary representations of the Second World War is certainly important; it has been explored extensively. 47 However, this question is here deliberately left to one side in order to focus specifically on war and to destabilise categories that seem to be taken as given. In as much as politics is about 'a certain type of non-"natural" relationship to others' 48 , the exposure of seemingly 'natural' categories as problematic, and indeed impossible, through reading these novels constitutes a political intervention, particularly because of the stakes invested in such categories in relation to the question of war.
Recreating immediacy: Gert Ledig's Die Stalinorgel
Gert Ledig experienced the war both as a soldier and-after having been wounded-as a civilian. Die Stalinorgel, 49 originally published in 1955, was followed a year later by another novel, Vergeltung (Retaliation); unlike the Trümmerliteratur, both novels offer no positive gloss on anything about the war. The former, an account of the war on the Eastern front, was popular at the time, whilst the latter, a depiction of ninety minutes during an air raid, was considered too gruesome.
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The virtual disappearance of both novels until their recent 46 Ibid., 135. Die Stalinorgel is a complex, but equally harrowing account of 48 hours of battle over a single hill close to Leningrad, which however found more favour with the reading public and the critics. 53 Ledig's account of soldiers' experiences is different from those mentioned so far in that it offers no redeeming features to the war experience. This is not the story of a cruel world which is confronted through a sense of duty or with heroism. There is 'no mercy', not even for the dead, in Ledig's account. 54 War is a senseless hell, 'pure madness', an 'absurd spectacle of horror'. 55 Die Stalinorgel opens with the image of a lance-corporal, stuck upside down in a tree, both hands shot off and dead. 56 Half an hour later, when the tree is felled by machine gun fire, the lance-corporal also loses a foot. 'When he fell on the ground, he was only half a man.' 57 A minute later, what is left of him is flattened by a tank. An explosion throws up the mass of scraps of uniform, flesh and blood. 'Then finally the lance-corporal was left alone.' 58 As there is no one alive to report his death, the lance-corporal counts as missing.
We encounter the lance-corporal only when he is already dead. Like most characters in the novel, he is never given a name. They are referred to by their military rank only, which,
given that more than one major or sergeant appears, makes it quite difficult to follow them as the Russian trenches. This breaking up of the story seems to reflect the scramble of the senseless battle over the hill, in which finally no one wins. This, and the relentless realism of description, systematically undermines any simplistic identification with the soldiers. Any act that could potentially be described as altruistic or even heroic is contextualised within an account of confusion, egotism, base motives and appalling sanitary conditions. It is not just that no hero walks off into the sunset; it is that there are only characters in this novel who have already been brutalised to such an extent by the war that, even where they might commit an act of heroism, it appears futile, if not naive; it certainly would not inspire admiration.
Many elements of Ledig's novel are familiar to us from other war novels: a commanding officer issuing a senseless command and later coming to regret it; small acts of defiance against superior officers ('No soldier may refuse an order, but he may forget about it'. 59 ); desertion in the heat of battle; a fanatic insisting on shooting one particular deserter as a warning to others whilst hundreds retreat against orders; amputations under horrific conditions; brutality against captured enemies; orders which make no sense once they reach the front; ambiguous orders and superiors trying to shift responsibility to those they command; appalling conditions; an act of heroism; and death, death and death again.
However, unlike in novels like Im Westen nichts Neues, or indeed Wo warst du, Adam?, the point does not seem to be to draw the reader into sympathy with the common soldier in any straightforward way.
The description of grimy, dusty, hairy men vegetating in a hole in the ground, waiting to fulfil an order that will almost certainly result in their death, trying to numb themselves with alcohol, defecating onto a spade or into empty tins, so that they need not risk their lives by crawling out of the hole, 60 undercuts any notion of underdog heroes. Equally, when engineer
Meller-one of the few characters with a name-blows himself up with two hand grenades in a bid to create an opening for his unit which has been surrounded, he does so only because 59 Ibid., 29.
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Ibid., 13.
he has already received a fatal wound to the stomach.
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Meller's death is described in gruesome detail and his commanding officer finds himself unable to write the usual letter to the family about the 'shot in the chest and painless death'. However, this is not to conjure up some sentimental notion of a common humanity. The Germans are also described as 'animals' by a Russian, 64 and both are observed in acts of brutality against enemy soldiers. 65 This evenhanded treatment, which nevertheless offers no hope, is crucial in terms of the standard objection against German war memories as portraying the Germans as victims of the Third Reich, as counting up German suffering against the suffering of the victims of the Germans.
Ledig's novel is not about German soldiers, and therefore arguably of little use to any revisionist reconstruction of German identity; it is about the senseless hell of war.
Finally, the novel is such a horrific read not just because of all the gruesome detail, but because of its complete denial of hope. Already the opening scene is one of uncontrolled mayhem in which it is impossible, and would certainly be irrational, to have the slightest concern for others. Throughout the novel there is no comradeship under fire to take the edge off the horror conjured up in the painstakingly detailed description. However, unlike Remarque, Ledig does not seem to be interested in generating sympathy for those who had to go through the hell of war. This novel is less about the soldiers' plight than, more fundamentally, about the futility and gruesomeness of war. As the major observes, he 'wanted to go to hell. And here it was. Complete with everything a sick mind could imagine'. 70 The 'betrayal' is thus both more ambiguous and more complete than that which Remarque may be describing. In the final scene of the book, the survivors of the battle attend a funeral. The army chaplain speaks of the comfort coming from the knowledge of salvation after death. The sergeant and the major leave during the funeral, discussing their 'secret' hope that this is true. As the major notes: 'It doesn't bear thinking about that we may be cheated even out of that'. with any telling of the past, is foregrounded. Thus, the idea of a 'truth' about the past is a fiction, because this truth is itself subject to change in time. This truth itself has a history. Or
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Tachibana, Narrative as Counter-Memory, 1.
as Walser puts it, we cannot recall what was as we experienced it then because we are no longer who we were. It is this reflection on time, truth and memory that makes Walser's novel relevant beyond the specific story it may be telling. Taking seriously this aspect of the novel also makes it necessary to go beyond an interpretation that focuses on how Walser opposes public forms of memory against private conscience in a bid to value the latter over the former. 107 This may be what Walser as a person intended, though we don't know; but it is not all his text tells us.
Breaking up the categories
Depictions of the Second World War by German writers are invariably interpreted in relation to politics. As mentioned above, Pfeifer has criticised novels about this war for excluding the political context. More specifically, Ledig's strategy of rendering vivid the brutality of the war, according to Pfeifer, limits itself to the trivial message that war is nasty, thereby failing to understand the particular problem of the Second World War.
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Thus, this literature is considered to be apolitical, and inappropriately so. It is indeed precisely this supposedly apolitical construction of the novels that is seen to reflect a problematic political attitude.
Walser's strategy of portraying only what was part of the direct experience of the boy whose childhood and youth he tells is seen as something of a political ploy: 'The richness of description conceals the desire to find normality in a time that could never be considered normal'.
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In other words, Walser's nostalgic focus on the small town of Wasserburg excludes discussion of the system of National Socialism not only because the situation is seen through a boy's eyes, but because Walser seeks to focus on the normality of the past, thereby making it appear better, or more politically innocent, than it was. In Walser's case, This debate might appear to be the obvious context within which
Walser's literary work must be interpreted. 113 Walser's interest in generating a more positive self-image of the German nation then becomes the lens through which his literary work is read. This approach is limited, however, because it would seem to miss the most interesting implications of Walser's attitude towards memory; for such a supposedly political reading of the novels fails to consider their political implications beyond assigning them a location on the left-right spectrum of politics. Therefore, I argue in the next section that reading novels politically (as distinct from interpreting them simply as part of the context of politics) must note the way in which they break up categories around which thinking about war, and indeed politics, is sometimes organised in a simplistic fashion.
Beyond victim-perpetrator
As we have seen, there is concern that dwelling on German experiences of the Second World War will only lead to the Germans reinventing themselves as victims, as Moeller argues they did in the 1950s, 114 and to the creation of a historically detached sense of German identity. This has to be avoided because the Germans are properly seen as perpetrators: they started the war and moreover brutally murdered millions of civilians. But, however clear this distinction may be in the abstract, its possibility is under threat by any consideration of the particular. The concern about war memories as inevitably making the Whilst immediately after the war the Germans arguably saw themselves primarily as victims of both Nazism and the Allied war, they later had to recognise that they had been perpetrators. However, this classification then ruled out an acknowledgement of harrowing wartime experiences as part of official memory. In the 1990s, when interest in the expulsions and civilian experiences of wartime is finally again expressed, concern is raised about whether this means that the Germans are beginning to see themselves again as victims rather than perpetrators, simply because conceptually there is nowhere else to go.
Perpetrator and victim are the only categories available, and they are mutually exclusive.
However, an analytical approach to this past that must lead to the conclusion that a five-year old girl who died in the Hamburg fire storm has to be categorised as first and foremost a member of the perpetrator community seems, to put it mildly, of little use. It is precisely this shortcoming that makes it possible to turn the suffering of particular people into a myth of 'the Germans' as victims.
It is therefore crucial to recognise that the possibility of being 'perpetrator and victim in one' is at the heart of both the difficulty with war memories and, in fact, of political decisions relating to war today. This is not a position of moral equivalence, but it is one that faces the fact that the need to make difficult ethical decisions arises precisely when things are not clear. Therefore, if literature is able to raise doubts as to the mutual exclusivity and universal applicability of these categories, if it makes us understand that the intractable moral issue is precisely that people are rarely ever just one or the other but are often, to use the phrase again, 'perpetrator and victim in one', this is an important contribution to understanding war as an ethico-political problem. This does not make anything that happened less horrible or morally repulsive; it simply means that in war one is more likely to confront a mess in the face of which one has to make an ethical decision, rather than a neatly labelled multiple choice question where the answer is, at any rate, already given.
Beyond good war-bad war
Presumably, the worry about the appropriateness of memories is not so much about the past as it is about the future. There is rightly concern not only about not offending those who suffered most at the hands of Germans, but also about the political implications memories.
This concern usually focuses on how Germans supposedly do or should feel about themselves as a nation. This debate seems to be always ongoing; the Historikerstreit, the controversy about Daniel Jonah Goldhagen's Hitler's Willing Executioners, the Walser-Bubis debate and the debate about the Holocaust memorial in Berlin have all revolved around these questions and others have commented at length on them. 117 What is at issue in this article, however, is not how memories of the Second World War relate to how Germans seem to think about themselves, but to how they seem to think about war.
Though the rejection of war-'Nie wieder Krieg'-is seen as an important principle in postwar German politics, on closer examination it is actually a rejection of 'bad war' only. In the debates over uses of the military, Bundeswehr deployments abroad were from the start justified with reference to the Second World War. Crudely put, the Germans had to fight now, because their liberation from the Nazi regime had only been achieved through war and outside intervention. 118 In other words, they had to be ready to do for others what the Allies had done for them: liberate them from oppression and war by violent means. This is, in my view, and I have argued this elsewhere, problematic per se as ethico-political reasoning is removed from the actual case at hand and instead understood in the context of Germany's relation to the past. 119 Re-education in the Western sectors had been based on the shared responsibility of all Germans for Nazism and its crimes, and on the desire to ensure that the Germans would 'never again' wage war. 120 Thus, 'war' was to be bad as such, and 'Nie Though both terms may appear to be on an equal footing, each pair is actually dominated by the first term. For example, on the whole we tend to value supposedly male qualities such as rationality more highly than those taken to be female qualities such as sensitivity. A response to this may be to try to think in a way that overturns this hierarchy. However, whilst this is a useful first step, it leaves in place the structure of the system: we are still thinking in terms of gender difference. The overturning on its own is not enough because the hierarchy will reassert itself. A second step is necessary, namely to achieve a displacement, in other words, to begin thinking in terms of concepts that are not part of the previous system of thought.
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In our case, by devaluing German soldiers' activity merely because they were on the wrong side and hence fighting a 'bad war', the possibility of fighting a 'good war' remained wide open, was indeed-through the possibility of opposing the Allied war to the German Given the 'clean' representation of war on television today, this might be more important than it would at first appear.
Because thinking about war after 1945 involved an overturning but no displacement, it was possible for the hierarchy to flip back, and for the Germans to take their place again on the side of 'good war'. The confrontation with concrete war memories, far from necessarily leading to a moral relativism that counts German bodies against those killed by Germans, helps us to leave behind a system of thought that turns decisions about war into a choice between black and white, good war and bad war, and instead recognise the mess that calls for a responsible decision. This is crucial because in the post-Cold War, and certainly in the post-September 11, world it has increasingly become necessary to address the question of war, also for the Germans. Derrida insists that ethico-political decisions are called for precisely when things are not clear: 'When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said that there is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a program'.
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Literature is significant in this context as it may undermine the black-and-white choice we are presented with in relation to war by reminding us that, as In our context this means that the evilness of Germans' conduct, and our grasp of it, must not be diminished through a representation of Germans' (even if different Germans') suffering.
Kearney stresses the notion of 'narrative truth' when it comes to matters of historical trauma, 141 whilst Sebald speaks of the necessity of 'an artificial view' as eye witnesses would invariably have been impaired in their capacity to think and feel. is advertised on its back cover as 'more authentic than any factual report'. 143 We might be turning to fiction to avoid something that is too much, the closure imposed by historical narrative. Hayden White has suggested that the 'value attached to narrativity in the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary'. facticity of the account that is disputed, but its contextualisation or rather, as the critics would have it, the lack thereof. May the hardships German soldiers experienced at the front be narrated without giving the whole context of the atrocities committed in the name of the Third Reich? The concern here, although possibly presented as one about 'the full truth', is about ethics. This is where Walser's worry about an ethically corrected memory comes in. But the implications of his intervention are not straightforward as it does not promote simply the right to speak out about how things were, whether or not it fits in with approved notions of an ethical attitude towards the past; for Walser rejects the notion that there is a true memory which we could recover: he argues for his right to represent his memory-which he at the same time points out does not and cannot appeal to an unchanging truth that we might seek to recover.
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Conclusion
Discussions about the usage of the military instrument in Germany, but also elsewhere, often refer back to the Second World War. Note that this would seem to be rather in tension with the simplistic political views in the context of which his work is often read. the present interferes with the past whenever we remember draw attention to the impossibility of simply recovering or representing 'the truth' about war. It is not a matter of simply having to acquire more information: there will always be an excess, competing narratives will never provide simply the truth. To put this differently, it is not that fiction finally provides us with the truth about war, but that it provides us with food for thought both about the desire to know and, ultimately, the impossibility of fully knowing war.
This is adamantly not to say that we should not seek as much knowledge as possible, but merely that knowledge does not, in relation to war, provide us with a secure way forward.
As Derrida notes, 'Not that it is necessary not to know. On the contrary, it is necessary to know the most and the best possible, but between the widest, the most refined, the most necessary knowledge, and the responsible decision, an abyss remains, and must remain'.
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The security of knowledge about war was undermined by a close look which revealed that the categorisations and clear dichotomies in arguments about war become problematic as soon as we engage with the particular. This invariably leads to a loss of (moral) certainty, something that might appear threatening to some. From a Derridean angle, however, this encounter with the aporia, the non-way, is, in contrast, an opportunity that makes ethicopolitical decisioning possible. Reading novels about war politically is, as a consequence, a significant way in which we may approach the ethico-political question of war.
We cannot simply learn from the past and be certain about what we should do in relation to war today. It is, however, precisely by recognising this that we may avoid being lulled into a false sense of security: a belief that the application of abstract categories and rules will ensure that we are acting ethically. The aporia of war lies not only in the tragedy of violent death but in the inevitability of decisions that will never be fully just, that are marked by the 'ordeal of the undecidable'. It is imperative, if we are interested in responsibility and ethicality at all, that we acknowledge the ethical tension and the failure of knowledge in the face of it. 
